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the 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1 Introduction
In most developed and less developed countries, a non-negligible set of enterprises produce and sell
goods or services with partial or full public nancing, and under the control of a variety of govern-
mental institutions. The US hosts government-sponsored corporations, federally owned corpora-
tions, quasi-governmental agencies in which governmental involvement is formalized (e.g. United
States Postal Service, Tenessee Valley Authority). More than one thousand public hospitals are
funded and controlled by state and local governments. Canada hosts para-public organizations like
Universities and Hydro-Québec. France has its public establishments for industrial and commer-
cial purpose(EPIC) that manage metro and train infrastructures, opera, etc. Less transparent are
some for-prot rms that nevertheless remain under the governments control. For instance, Am-
track has all preferred stocksowned by the US Department of Transport and its CEO appointed
by US Congress. In China and across the emerging world, many government-linked corporations
are e¤ectively controlled by their governments, even though they are listed in the stock markets
and nanced with private equity and debt.
State-owned rms that are nanced, owned and controlled by the government are of major
economic importance in many countries. While such rms contributed between 6-8% of total
GDP across countries worldwide in the late nineties, public interventions in the last decade have
led governments to own approximately one fth of global stock market capitalization (Megginson
and Netter, 2001). A particular feature of state-owned or state-controlled rms is that they
hold signicant levels of debt in the form of loans and bonds to the private sector, which reduce
government equity injections. State-owned rms usually incur debt levels higher than a third of
their assets and are responsible for the issuance of many bonds worldwide. DSouza and Megginson
(1999) and Megginson et al. (1994) observe that state-owned rmsaverage debt-to-asset ratio
range from 29% to 66%, and that these ratios decreased after privatization. Borisova et al. (2012)
describe no less than a thousand bonds issued by 215 listed state-owned rms across 43 countries
in the last decade.
Debt leverage has become a concern for many governments and regulators. For example, the
recent increase of debt leverage amongst public and private rms operating in regulated markets
has motivated Ofwat, the UK water regulator, to introduce restrictions on companies operating
with high debt levels (Correia da Silva et al., 2006; NAO, 2015). Similarly, the high leverage of
procurement projects has increased the probability of nancial distress and hence the frequency
of renegotiation and recapitalization of Public-Private-Partnership contracts (Engel, Fischer &
Galetovic, 2010; Klein, 2012; Moore, Straub & Dieter, 2014; Yescombe, 2011).
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The use of external debt by state-owned companies is striking for two reasons. On the one hand,
governments generally access credit markets at better conditions than private agents. Because
governments hold diversied portfolios of public projects, have recourse to taxation and face no
bankruptcy risk, government bonds are considered as risk free and o¤er the lowest interest rates in
most modern economies. As a consequence, public projects should be internally funded from the
Treasury rather than externally with private creditors. On the other hand, the use of external debt
contracts introduces the possibility of bankruptcy when state-owned rms are unable to meet their
debt obligations. The government must then face the di¢ cult decision of whether to renance and
bail-out state-owned rms, or to let them default and relinquish its control to private creditors.
A number of state-owned rms have indeed defaulted in the past and are still undergoing default
procedures today. Creditors acquired (temporary) control of defaulting rms during the Asian crisis
in the late 1990s. Many European public airline companies went bankrupt and/or were privatized
in the past decades. Post companies like the UK Royal Mail are set in the process of privatization
because their debts became a subject of intense political concern. In China, thousands of smaller
Chinese central and regional state-owned companies have gone bankrupt over the years. Between
1975 and 2008, many nancially distressed public hospitals in the US were unable to service their
debts because of insu¢ cient revenues resulting from excess capacity and increasing number of
uninsured patients. Due to deteriorating public nances, many local governments refused to inject
new funds and decided to privatize them (Ramamonjiarivelo, 2012, Ramamonjiarivelo et al., 2014).
Such cases of default and subsequent privatization of state-owned rms necessitate govern-
mentscommitment to -immediately or eventually- stop subsidizing the rm and face the risk of
operational disruption and employeesand citizensdiscontent.1 These examples take place under
crisis conditions and in complex multi-year processes, often involving interim subsidies. Never-
theless, they highlight the fact that debt contracts may trigger governments disinvestment in
non-performing state-owned rms. In many instances, bankruptcy is not a necessary step for pri-
vatization. Numerous money-losing state-owned enterprises have placed themselves under pressure
of their creditors before ling for bankruptcy. The have been privatized and sold to consortia of
private investors that often included former creditors. Hence, the broader question that we explore
in this article is whether the debt policy and the subsequent pressure from creditors can be used
by governments as instruments to discipline state-owned rmsmanagements.
The objective of this article is to highlight the role of debt leverage when state-owned rms
1In this article we dene liquidation as the governments act of defaulting and subsequently privatizing the
state-owned rm to private creditors or investors.
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benet from information advantages. We show that the government has incentives to induce the
state-owned rms to take a debt contract with private creditors because the possibility of not
bailing out the rm reduces information rents.2
To highlight this mechanism, we revisit the natural monopoly regulation set-up with adverse
selection presented in Baron and Myerson (1982) and La¤ont and Tirole (1993). A utilitarian and
benevolent government monitors a state-owned rm operating in a natural monopoly market, such
as transport, water, energy, waste, and health.3 The government faces an information asymmetry
because the rms management has private knowledge about the rms cost (or demand parameter).
The government faces a budget constraint that is summarized by its shadowcost of public funds
as discussed at length in La¤ont and Tirole (1993).4 It maximizes a welfare objective that mixes
the surplus to consumer, producer and creditors with the social cost of public transfers. The
government o¤ers incentive contracts to the state-owned rms managers to reveal their private
information at the cost of leaving rents to those managers. When the state-owned rm asks to be
refunded, the government can either subsidize or reinject equity in the rmsoperations, or let the
rm default and thereby relinquish its ownership to the creditors.5 Ex-ante, the information rent
increases with the range of the costs under which the state-owned rm operates. The government
therefore has an incentive to reduce this range by defaulting the rms that report too high cost.
This is the reason why debt can be used to diminish the extent of information rents. However,
by doing this, the government foregoes information about true performance of defaulted rms.
Defaulting may then also harm consumers as creditors have incentives to set too high prices.6
In this article, we show that the cost realization above which the government decides to default
depends on the balance between information rents and allocative ine¢ ciency after the change of
2Default provisions of typical loan agreements and bond prospectuses often exclude government guarantee clauses;
they thus convey an implicit no-bailout commitment.
3Many state-owned companies are local natural monopolies like in water supply in poor countries and hospital
care in sparsely populated rural America (Auriol and Blanc, 2009, Alexander et al., 1996, Langabeer, 2006). Before
2002, EU national airlines could benet from an articial monopoly position under countriesair transport bilateral
agreements. Our analysis of monopoly can be generalized to oligopolistic markets as in Auriol and La¤ont (1992)
and Auriol and Picard (2008).
4As in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), our model assumes that the shadow cost of public funds summarizes the
tightness of the government budget constraint, whereby larger shadow costs indicate tighter budget constraints and
increased opportunity cost of public funds.
5Creditors may in turn on-sell these defaulted rms to other private investors.
6Our base model assumes that government does not, but creditors do observe costs and prefer to set monopoly
price following default and privatization. In the Appendix, we examine the case of price cap regulation post
privatization to mitigate the allocative ine¢ ciency.
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ownership.7 The government prefers to inject equity from the Treasury and set the debt to zero
when it faces low enough shadow costs of public funding. In this case, the information rent mainly
consists of a redistribution mechanism from taxpayers to the state-owned rms, which has no social
cost but makes debt an uninteresting instrument. This phenomenon may explain why most of the
federally-, state- or city-owned rms in the developed economies borrow directly from their own
Treasury and therefore use the public funding capabilities for their investments. In contrast, the
government prefers to have the rm borrow from the private sector in many other situations. Debt
is used for large enough shadow cost of public funds, such as it can be seen in developing countries.
The social cost of information rents is then larger, which entices the government to use higher
debt levels. The existence of social cost of public funds then becomes a key factor of leverage
and privatization under asymmetric information. Other things equal, indebted state-owned rms
should then be found more often in developing countries with strong nancial constraints.
Literature The contribution of the paper is to explain how asymmetric information a¤ects
the choice of debt leverage in state-owned rms or in private rms lead by the government inter-
ests. It therefore inserts in the abundant literature on the benets and costs of state and private
ownership.8 The paper closely follows La¤ont and Tiroles (1993) framework with asymmetric
information between government and rms and with social cost of public funding. Our discussion
focuses on natural monopoly markets owned and operated by a government that is uninformed and
nancially constrained.9 The paper adds on Auriol and Picard (2008, 2009) by introducing debt
leverage as an instrument that help alleviating information rents by excluding weaker rms from
the governments equity injections.10 The article also presents a new disciplining e¤ect of debt
contracts on better informed managers of public rms. It therefore complements the corporate
nance literature on the role of debt as tool to alleviate moral hazard issues (e.g. Dewatripont
and Tirole, 1994).11 In contrast with Gale and Hellwig (1985), information transmission at the
7The threshold cost level that we derive resembles that of Auriol and Picard (2009). In their study of outsourcing
contracts the government mitigates the social cost of initial investments by contracting with a monopolist private
operator and o¤ering ex-post contracts only to private operators with costs below a welfare optimal threshold.
8See e.g. La¤ont and Tirole (1993), La¤ont (2005), Megginson and Netter (2001) and Chang (2007).
9Auriol and Picard (2008) discuss privatization in the context of oligopollies.
10Exclusion and participation constraints in principal agent models have been studied by Jullien (2000) and also
applied by Calzolari and Scarpa (2009) to the study of regulation of exporting monopolies.
11For Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Tirole (2005) and Myers (2001) debt mitigates moral hazard issues. Short
term debt helps commit managers to making decisions that are better aligned with the objectives of rm owners,
creditors and investors. For Leite (2001) short term debt allow investors to seize control of the rm in low prot
states, which disciplines the manager.
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liquidation stage is here assumed to have no cost because we study the welfare trade-o¤ between
information advantages before and after default.12 The paper also discusses a form of interaction
between debt nancing and product market behavior in the presence of state-owned rms. While
higher leverages entice private rms to produce less in oligopolistic markets (Faure-Grimaud, 2000;
Povel and Raith, 2004), they here have no e¤ect on the production of the state-owned rms that
are not defaulted. Leveraging however leads to more privatization and thus higher prices and lower
aggregate output.
The article di¤ers from a series of research contributions about the interaction between regu-
lated rms and debt levels. In this literature, debt leverage is used by private owners to alleviate
the hold-up problem created by opportunistic regulators in the context of exogenous bankruptcy
"distress" costs (Dasgupta Nanda 1993; Spiegel and Spulber, 1994). In the same line of research,
Cambini and Spiegel (2015) examine the debt and capital structure of the regulated rms that
make investments under cost uncertainty and must produce under rigid regulated prices. By con-
trast, the present paper only considers state-owned rms, does not encompass any opportunistic
behaviours and distress costs and does not discuss the sizes of investments. Also, prices are here
determined ex-post according to ex-post information reports.
Finally, the article relates to the literature on Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP). A few papers
address the question of debt leverages in PPPs.13 de Bettignies and Ross (2009) study the choices
of state-owned rmsdebt and default in an asymmetric information setting like ours, but they
root such choices in government o¢ cials interests for re-election. Iossa and Martimort (2015)
discuss the impact of outside nance on the risk sharing structure of PPP contracts in the context
of moral hazard. They show that outside nance improves risk sharing between governments and
PPPs managers when creditors have more information on PPPs actions than governments. They
do not o¤er explanation for high debt leverages. Menezes and Ryan (2015) show how PPP consortia
take debts in order to hold up government and tax payers. Debts insure them with more prot in
low demand states because it forces governments to renegotiate concession contracts. This short
12Appendix C extends the model to bankruptcy and auditing costs. While these factors lower the maximum
feasible debt level, our overall results remain unchanged.
13An exception is Engel et al. (2013). In general, the literature on PPP discusses the costs and benets of task
delegation of public services to private rms and considers the complementarity in construction and operational
tasks as the main reason for delegation to private or semi-public consortia. Many authors have focused on questions
of renegotiation, design, moral hazard and assessment of PPPs (e.g. Dewatripont and Legros, 2005, Guasch et al.,
2006, Iossa et al., 2007, Estache et al., 2008 and 2009, Engel et al., 2013, Estache and Saussier 2014). With the
recent exception of Iossa and Martimort (2012), this literature does not discuss the issue of information acquisition
(adverse selection) that is the basis of the earlier literature on regulation theory that we build upon (Baron and
Myerson, 1982, La¤ont and Tirole, 1993).
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literature does nally not study the role of social costs of public funds as it is done in this paper.
The article is organized as follows. To make precise our research object, Section 2 provides case
studies about state-owned rms and debt leverage. Section 3 presents our model while Section 4
discusses the output, price and default decisions under asymmetric information. Section 5 describes
the choice of the optimal debt level. Section 6 discusses our main results. Section 7 concludes
and identies areas for further research. Proofs and extensions are respectively relegated to the
Appendices A, B and C.
2 Case studies
Before presenting our analysis, it is important to document important features about state-owned
rms. The rst feature is about their nancial independence and discretion in making capital struc-
ture decisions. In this paper we argue that by determining the amount of state equity injections
or subsidies, the government implicitly determines the rms debt level. The role of government
in debt decisions is further amplied by the the states inuence in the choice of board and man-
agement members and in the legal articles of state-owned companies. Furthermore, the existence
of nancial transfers from or to government in terms of dividends, equity injections and appropri-
ations amplies the state-owned rms dependence. The second feature is that many state-owned
rms issue debt and bonds without government guarantees. The existence of non-guaranteed debt
makes private creditors the residual claimants of the rm when the latter is unable to pay interests
and repay the borrowed capital. The role of government then becomes crucial as it can avoid
subsidizing or injecting capital and let the rm default. The third feature relates to the use -or
the threat of use- of the debt bankruptcy clauses or procedures by the creditors of state-owned
rms. In this paper we derive and argue that the threat of bankruptcy lowers the state-owned
rms incentives to misreport their true performances.
Table 1 presents cases of state-owned rms in OECD countries with their nancial structures
and links to governmental institutions. The table includes the share of public ownership, share of
government representatives in the board, equity, amounts of debt that are guaranteed and not guar-
anteed by governments, amount of subsidies or equity injections and possible dividend payments or
taxes to the government. Those examples show a strong nancial and decision making dependence
in the railway, energy and post mail sectors. They also show evidence of non-guaranteed debt. We
now review some of those examples in more details, begining with railway network markets. For
the sake of readility, most source references are relegated to Appendix A.
The French Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) is wholy owned by the French
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government and has only governments representatives in the board. The rms dependence is
also reected in the performance contract that was agreed between the government and the
Réseau Ferré Français (RRF), the network infrastructure component of the SNCF holding between
1997 and 2014. Co-signed by the French President and four competent French Ministers for
the period of 2009-2012 and renewed until 2014, this contract specied the relationship between
prices and costs and the part of the debt that should be funded by rms revenues (60%). Its
board included members nominated by the Ministers and Presidents of French Regions, etc. The
ongoing management of debt in the credit markets was subject to a risk/return coe¢ cient given
by this board. SNCF receives substantial investment subsidies from the central government and
appropriations for its services to regional collectivities. It pays regular dividends to the State
although, in 2014, the government declared not to require dividends to help the rm reducing its
decit. Recently, the French general accountability o¢ ce (Cour des Comptes) expressed concerns
about the rms high dividends and endebtedness. The debt level is largely above the amount
of equity of the rm and other rms in the sector. The existence of a debt guarantee by the
government is not written in the law governing semi-public rms (EPIC) and therefore SNCF.
The current rms CEO has claimed that the debt has no government guarantee although the
EU Court of Justice has recently judged that the public status of EPIC should give unlimited
guarantee. In the next years, the SNCF will probably clarify its status by changing to the one
of a private company (as it has been done for EDF, see below). More generally, at the same
time as highly indebted EU governments want to write the public rmsdebt o¤ their national
debt, they are increasingly forced by EU institutions to change public rmsstatus for doing so.
As a consequence, one shall be expect that EU governments reduce their commitments of debt
guarantees in a credible way.
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Similarly, the Société nationale des chemins de fer belge- Nationale Maatschappij der Belgis-
che Spoorwegen (SNCB-NMBS) is fully owned by the state and has its board members nominated
by the government. Similar to the SNCF, the railway infrastructure is operated as a "public au-
tonomous enterprise" and subject to a detailed management contract set in a decree law. The
latter species the nominal debt level and growth rate, as well as the appropriations from the
government for investments (equity injection) and for non-commercial operations in favor of com-
muters, cross-border transit, public services, etc. (subsidies). SNCB-NMBS holds an amount of
debt that is close its equity. The rm emits Euro Non-Call Notes, whose prospectuses reveal no
guarantee by the state or public institutions. The rm is also subject to privatization pressures.
As a case in point, in 2014, its CEO expressed his concern about the necessity of privatization if
the rm could not get its debt under control.
Deutsche Bahn shares the same features. Its ownership structure, board and/or management is
strongly controled by the government while it receives many appropriations and equity injections
from its governments. In particular, the German federal government plans to inject 2400 million
Euros of equity over the next four years and will reduce its dividend requirement from 950 to
600 millions in 2016. It holds an amount of debt that amounts to almost twice its equity. Only
one percent of its debt is guaranteed by the federal government: this is for its borrowing from
Euroma, a international borrowing consortium requiring explicit government guarantees. In the
2000s Deutsche Bahn was subject to ongoing privatization discussions because of its recurrent
needs for equity injection. However, its introduction in the stock market has been postponed due
to 2008 nancial crisis.
In the US, the rail transport company, Amtrak, is managed by a board of 9 members appointed
by the President of the US and conrmed by its Senate. Founded in 1971, the rm was set up as a
federally chartered corporation that can receive taxpayer funding and operate intercity passenger
trains. As of 2015, Amtrak was capitalized with about 7 billions USD in equity mainly held by
federal and state governments. It receives about 1 billion USD appropriations for its operations
from the federal and state governments annually. It has a debt level of less than 1 billion USD. The
loans and bonds are backed by Amtrak assets such as locomotives or by pledges in the equipement
or infrastructure the money is used for. Amtrak takes Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
Financing (RRIF) loans from the US Department of Transportation, which can but need not
provide guarantees (to our knowledge, such guarantees are not formally stated). In addition,
Amtrak issued commercial debts to private suppliers and clients and unsecured loans to foreign
debtholders. Amtrak is at the heart of many controversies because it has never achieved self-
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su¢ ciency. In 1995 Amtrak was unable to continue to service its debts and was refunded by the
Congress for 5 billion USD. The same problem occurred in 2013 at a time of US economic crisis
where federal appropriations where cut and the Congress waited to vote for additional federal
funding. In a quality control audit certied by Ernst & Young, the Inspector General stated that
"without the receipt of Federal Government funding, the Company will not be able to continue in
its current form, and signicant operating changes, restructurings, or bankruptcy might occur."14
Unsecured creditors, particularly the Export-Import Bank of Canada, had incentives to force to
company to enter a Chapter 7 liquidation process and receive repayment for the equipment they
have nanced (e.g. for the Acelas, Viewliners and Superliners projects). In theory, the Congress
could have granted cash and guarantee loans quickly, but it took many years to decide what to do.
In the meantime Amtrakassets could have been restructured, split and or sold.
In the energy sector, the state-owned rms presented in Table 1 have similar features: their
ownership structures and boards are strongly controled by governments. By contrast, they gener-
ally o¤er cash revenues to governments in terms of dividends or special taxes. For instance, the
French government holds a 85% share of the capital of French national electricity company, Elec-
tricité de France (EDF). The board includes six members elected by the shareholdersassembly,
six proposed by the employees, ve proposed by the government and, a State representative who
has veto power. In spite of the strong public inuence, the rm is currently endowed with the legal
status of a private company. This is because the 2004 liberalization of the EU electricity market
forced the rm to drop its public rm status (EPIC), making clear that its debt is not guaranteed
by public institutions. EDF generally pays good dividends and returns on equity, about 5% in 2015
(see 2000=34749 from Table 1). That year, the rm increased its capital by 4000 million Euros,
three quarter of which was equity injection by the French government. EDF holds a debt level
of the same order of its equity. In practice, EDF emits Euro Non-Call Notes, whose prospectuses
state no government guarantees.
In the US, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) supplies electricity and natural resource
management in Tennessee and parts of Mississippi (Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina
and Virginia). It is a federally-owned corporation with a board of directors appointed and con-
rmed by the President of the US. Its overall goal is to remain prot-neutral and o¤er inexpensive
energy. Yet, ve percent of its gross revenues are collected for the states in which it operates. It is
14See Amtrak O¢ ce of Inspector General, Quality Control Review of the Independent Audit of Amtraks Con-
solidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ended 2013 and 2012. Report No. OIG-A-2015-003, January 13,
2015.
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not authorized to issue stock shares and does not receive any federal funding, which explains the
absence of subsidy in Table 1 and the recourse to various debt instruments. TVA nances its in-
vestments and operations through the sale of TVA bonds, some of them with equity convertibility.
However, the federal government does not explicitly guarantee any TVA bonds, meaning that if
TVA was to default on any of its debt, the government is not obliged to repay the TVAs creditors
or bondholders. Finally, discussions on privatization were introduced by the Obama adminitration
in 2013. The huge debt is an issue as it is considered by some political bodies to be part of the
national debt.
The Italian petroelum corporation, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), became a private com-
pany by Law Decree in 1992, the government selling 70% of its shares in the stock market mainly
to international institutional investors. However, six out of the nine board members are nominated
by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance that has de facto control over the rm through
its bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. ENI holds bank loans and emits Euro notes (bonds), in which
no government guarantees are stated. Talks of privatisation exist but are linked to the Italian
debt. The reality however provides a mixed spectrum for the government debt guarantees. For
instance, Hydro-Quebec, one of the largest world hydropower producer, has a debt that is larger
than twice its equity and structured with bonds that are backed by the Quebec government. The
rm is regularly subject to discussions about privatization to lower the Canadian provinces public
debt.
Table 1 also reports two state-owned rms before their privatization, which provides information
about state-owned rms in debt crises. Before 2015, the TAP Portugal airline was fully owned
and controled by Portuguese public authorities. It had negative equity and some 1062 million
debt partly secured by its assets (aircrafts and other). In our research we have seen was no
mention of explicit state guarantees. Because of EU regulations on state aids, the Portuguese
government could not inject capital into the heavily-indebted and loss-making rm, leaving it on
the brink of bankruptcy. The privatization of the Portuguese state-owned airline Tap Air was then
conducted as part of the EU/IMF bailout to repay the companys outstanding debt. TAP Portugal
was nally privatized in November 2015 when Portuguese government sold 61% of its shares. It
nevertheless bought back 11% of shares up in early 2016 to regain the majority control of the
rm. Bankruptcy of European state-owned rms is perhaps a regular event in the air transport
sector, which is subject to instability. In 2001, the Belgian government relinquished the state-
owned airline company, Sabena, to its creditors when that the rm was unable to repay is debts.
Around the same time, the government-owned Swissair company was handed over to a liquidator
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after being unable to make payments to creditors and UBS AGs refusal to extend its line of credit.
The company was sold to Lufthansa a few years later. In 2008, the Italian government led its
national airline Alitalia for bankruptcy and later sold its shares in a privatization program.
Near-bankruptcy is also present in post mail services. Intense discussions about privatisation
of UK Royal Mail company took place during the 2000s after several years of losses. A main reason
was the lack of expertise in addition to lack of external nancing and growing pension decit.
Finally, the Chinese market that o¤er many stories about state-owned rms. The largest na-
tional oil, and telecommunication companies such as PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, China Telecom
and many others are listed on the Hong Kong and Chinese stock markets, and raise signicant
levels of unguaranteed loans and bonds from private lenders and investors, both domestically and
internationally. These companiesstrategic and funding decisions continue to be inuenced by the
Chinese government, as the Chairman and many senior directors and managers of these rms are
either appointed by the government or have previously worked in the government policy-making
and regulatory institutions. Many of those rms have faced di¢ culties and bankruptcy threats.
This is the case of the state-owned Baoding Tianwei Group Company, that became the rst o¢ cial
case of a Chinese state-owned rm bankruptcy. Active in electrical power transformers and other
electrical equipments, it engaged in wind mill and solar panel manufacturing. However, market
oversupply and operational issues led the company to losses so that it had to default on a bond
interest payment. When banks required the rm to repay its bonds in 2015, the Chinese govern-
ment decided to let the rm le for bankruptcy.15 Other thousands of smaller Chinese central and
regional state-owned companies have gone bankrupt over the years. In the process many assets
and rms have been reallocated to stronger rms, including to private operators (World Bank,
2001).
Those cases clarify the extent and the role of government in state-owned company funding.
Debts are often directly or indirectly decided by government instances or representatives. They
are also not systematically associated with government guarantees and their debt level have become
a concern of bankruptcy threat in some instances. The following section describes a model in which
the motivation for leveraging state-owned rms with nonguaranteed debt stems from the rents
associated to their control.
15See Bloomberg News, April 22, 2015.
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3 The model
We consider a state-owned rm with a natural monopoly position and increasing returns to scale
technology. As in Baron and Myerson (1982) and La¤ont and Tirole (1993), the rm is owned
by the government and incurs an up-front xed investment cost K that yields uncertain economic
surplus and prot. The rm sells its output Q to consumers who enjoy a gross surplus S(Q),
S 0 > 0 > S 00, and whose inverse demand function is given by P (Q) = S 0(Q), P 0 < 0. Their
net surplus is given by N(Q) = S(Q)   P (Q)Q, with N 0 > 0. Production and sales yield an
operational prot  (;Q) that includes revenues minus production costs (exclusive of investment
cost K). The operational prot depends on the output and an uncertain performance parameter
. To conform with the regulation literature, we will say that this parameter is a cost parameter
of the rm (although it can readily be interpreted as demand parameter). Its probability density
and cumulative functions are given by g() and G() on the support [; ]. In this paper we need
not be specic about this cost function and nd it more instructive to focus the discussion on
operational prots  (;Q). We just assume that the cost parameter negatively a¤ects the prot
and the marginal prot so that  < 0 and Q < 0 whereas we assume QQ < 0 to guarantee
concavity of prot.16 To ease the analysis, we assume that there always exists a positive production
surplus after the investment is made and that production always reaches a nite level. That is,
limQ!0 
 
;Q

> 0 and limQ!1 (;Q) < 0 8. Once the investment is sunk, the economic
surplus is equal to the sum of consumer net surplus and production surplus N(Q) +  (;Q). We
assume the latter to be a strictly concave function of Q to guarantee an interior socially optimal
solution.
We study three parties: (i) the national or local government as benevolent utilitarian planner or
industry regulator, (ii) the manager of the state-owned rm, and (iii) a group of private creditors.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all parties are risk neutral and have zero opportunity
costs of time. They all know the value of the investment cost K. To focus on the issue of debt
leverage, we suppose that the investment decision K is given. The point is to set the appropriate
debt-equity structure. The manager of the state-owned rm gets a utility U from her position and
has a reservation utility to work in the company, which we normalize to zero. Creditors raise their
funds in capital market at zero interest rates and get a utility C from the di¤erence between the
16For instance, performance paramerer  can be the rms marginal cost so that the prot writes as  (;Q) =
P (Q)Q Q. Concavity conditions require that the demand function is not too convex: P 00Q+P 0 < 0. By contrast,
 can be about demand so that prot is dened as  (;Q) = P (;Q)Q   c(Q) with P (;Q) = 1     Q. The
same analysis and result apply.
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cash they lend and get repaid. (The assumptions of zero interest rates and zero opportunity costs
of time are relaxed in Appendix C.) For simplicity and as presented in Table 1, the government
is the sole equity owner. It is endowed with a benevolent, utilitarian objective that encompasses
the surpluses of consumption, production, manager and creditors in addition to the social cost of
transfers from the Treasury.
As in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), the governments social cost of public funding is summarized
by the shadow cost of public funds  > 0, which represents the deadweight cost of raising one
dollar from tax payers. It measures the governments shadow value of raising public funds; the
tougher its budget constraint, the higher . More precisely, any dollar spent by the government
implies a social cost of 1 +  to the society. This social cost reects the administrative cost of
taxation and the economic ine¢ ciencies in taxing labor, production and consumption (Auriol and
Warlters, 2012). It is estimated to lie in a range about  = 0:3 in developed economies and in
a range higher than  = 0:9 in least developed countries (World Bank, 1998). This parameter
can become even higher for government under very strong nancial constraints (e.g. under EU or
IMF restructuring pressures).17 The shadow cost of public funds is a parameter of aggregate tax
distortions. It allows us to concentrate on the micro-economic distortions in the product market
and in the agency relationship between government and state-owned rms.
The model includes two stages depicted in Figure 1.
17The shadow cost of public funds actually measures the welfare impact of a marginal change in the governments
total budget. Because the transfer to the state-owned rm is supposed to be marginal compared to the total budget,
the shadow cost of public funds has the same value for positive and negative transfers (see La¤ont and Tirole, 1993).
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3.1 First stage
In the rst stage, the government supplies the amount of equity E from its Treasury and the
state-owned manager chooses the amount of debt D from creditors. However, this amount of debt
should balance the rms assets and liabilities so that E + D = K. The balance between equity
injection and debt reects the internal versus external funding trade-o¤ of the government. Given
that the nancing and investment transaction is observable and veriable, the rms manager can
make no utility out of it. Her utility is given by U1 = 0, where the subscript 1 refers to the rst
stage. On the other hand, the creditors raise the debt amount D in capital markets and lend it
to the rm. They make no utility out of the transaction in the rst stage so that their utility
is given by C1 = 0. In compensation for their transaction, they are promised a debt repayment
R (R  D) from the state-owned rm in the second stage. The government considers the total
welfare, W1 = U1 + C1   (1 + )E, which includes the manager and creditorsutilities and the
social cost from making public transfers to the rms. This simplies to
W1 =   (1 + )E: (1)
To sum up, the rst stage welfare is equal to the equity injection at the shadow cost of public
funds.
At the end of rst stage, the uncertainty in the cost parameter  realizes. The government is
not informed about the realization of this cost.
3.2 Second stage
In the second stage, the state-owned rm produces and sells its goods or services and must repay
the promised repayment R to the private creditors. If it cannot repay R; the rm however gets
defaulted. As the main shareholder, the government relinquishes the rm to the private creditors
and looses its control and cash-ow rights on the rm: the rm is privatized.1819 The government
may however wish to give a transfer T to the rm or receive  T from it according to its balance
between economic surplus and cost of public transfers. When T > 0, the government subsidizes
the rm or reinjects equity in the rm while it taxes the prots or gets the dividends when T < 0.
Subsidies typically are appropriations that complement the cost of public service as is the case for
18As in the literature following Spiegel and Spulber (1994), creditors become the residual claimants of the rms
prot.
19In the remainder of this article we use the terms liquidationand privatizationinterchangeably. Indeed, in
practice, the assets of the rm can be liquidated to repay creditors and the control and cash-ow rights is transfered
to a private investor who takes over the rms operation.
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railways (e.g. USA, Belgium and France in Table 1). In EU, extreme cases of equity injections are
"state aids for restructuring rms in di¢ culty" as foreseen by the EU Article 87(c).20
Formally, the government asks the state-owned rms manager to report its cost b and decides
whether the rm is viable for production under state ownership or whether it should be defaulted
and left to creditors. The government proposes the contract fQ(b); T (b); '(b)g that species the
output, transfer and default decision ' 2 f0; 1g according to the managers cost report b. On the
one hand, if '(b) = 0 the state-owned rm pays its debt, sells its goods or services at the price
P (Q(b)), receives (or pays) the transfer T (b). The managers utility sums up to the operational
prot  (;Q) minus debt repayment R plus transfers T . The creditors get a utility equal to the
rms debt repayment R minus their own repayment to the capital market D. On the other hand,
the rm is defaulted if '(b) = 1. The manager loses her job and has zero utility while creditors
get the ownership of the rm and receive the rights to the operational prots of the rm,  (;Q)
and pay back D to the capital market. To sum up, the state-owned rm managers utility writes
as:
U2 = [ (;Q) R + T ] (1  ') :
where the subscript 2 refers to the second stage and where we dispense the variable with reported
cost b for the sake of readability. The creditors have a utility is given by
C2 = R (1  ') + 
 
;Ql

' D:
where Ql is the output that they can set after default since they then acquire the right to operate
the rm.2122
The change of ownership has its drawbacks. It shifts the private information to the creditors
who receive the control rights of the defaulted rm. This information asymmetry stems from the
fact that creditors usually comprise a group of informed banks with adequate monitoring technology
and incentives.23 To discuss this idea, we make the assumption that creditors are able to observe
20Although the Art. 107 TFEU prohibits aids to rms in the EU if they distort competition, it does not apply
to transfers or equity injections to activities that belong to the public remit (see e.g. Leipzig/Halle airport case
2015/1469. O¢ cial Journal of the European Union, L232, 4 September 2015).
21In case of a default and takeover, the creditors may decide to sell the rm to a private investor. Assuming an
e¢ cient sale, they receive the same value. Our analysis remains unchanged.
22Under symmetric information the government ensures e¢ cient output post liquidation. Under adverse selection,
however, the government is forced to leave rents to creditors. For instance, defaulted national airline companies
have full freedom to set their prices after the default and privatization stage.
23We make the assumption that experienced lenders are better informed than the government, and that there
are no collective action or coordination problems among members of the creditor group. In Appendix C we briey
discuss the possible impact of bankruptcy or creditor auditing costs.
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the cost parameter directly after the rm defaults on its debt repayment. At that point of time,
creditors have an informational advantage over the government.24 As a consequence, when the
government relinquishes its control rights on the rm and the production decision is transferred
to the creditors, the governments information decit makes it unable to regulate a well-dened
price on the defaulting rm. In this text, we avoid the discussion of renegotiation of inadequate
regulated prices25 (see Appendix C for a formal discussion of ex-post price cap). We assume that
the defaulting rm gets no price and output restriction so that creditors are free to set laissez-faire
prices after default and privatization. As a result, the output after privatization, Ql, is given by
the private monopoly output Qm()  arg maxQ (;Q).
The utilitarian government takes into account the consumer net surplus N (Q), the social cost
of public transfers, together with the utility of the state-owned rm and the creditors. The welfare
function reads as:
W2 (Q; T; '; U2; C2) = [N(Q)  (1 + )T ] (1  ') +N(Qm)'+ U2 + C2;
where  (1+)T represents socially costly transfers to the rm. In the spirit of Baron and Myerson
(1982), the government has the ability to recoup the state-owned rms prot by taxing the rm
or cashing-in dividends in the second stage (T < 0). Subsidies or equity (re-)injection in the
second stage (T > 0) can be used for the purpose of increasing output and consumer surplus.
As in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), the shadow cost of public funds, , reects the balance between
economic surplus and cost of government funding. The government concentrates on improving the
economic surplus if  = 0 while it aims only at improving the Treasury balance if !1.
The welfare can equivalently be written in several instructive forms. Plugging for the utility
levels of manager and creditors, we get the welfare as function of outputs, transfers and debt level:
W2 (Q; T; ';D) = [N(Q) +  (;Q)] (1  ') + [N(Qm) +  (;Qm)]' D   T (1  ') :
The three rst terms show the economic surpluses under operation and default and the debt paid
to capital market. The last term shows the transfer is evaluated at the shadow cost of public
funds. The same transfer may encompass many items: a subsidy to entice the state-owned rm to
produce closer to the social optimum, a tax to nance the Treasury, a subsidy to debt repayment,
and rents to the state-owned rms manager and creditors.
24This is in line with Gale and Hellwigs (1985) view of bankruptcy being an informational event that allows
creditors to learn the true state of the rm. However, in contrast to those authors we assume no audit cost at the
time of the change of ownership for the sake of simplicity.
25The same assumption is made in the literature. For instance, in Spiegel and Spulbert (1994) and Cambini and
Spiegel (2015), the price cap is decided before cost realisation and can never be renegociated.
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Finally, substituting the transfer T by the managers utility and the creditorsutility C2 by its
value, we get
W2 (Q;'; U2; R;D) = fN(Q) +  (;Q)   [R   (;Q)] Dg (1  ')
+ [N(Qm) +  (;Qm) D]'
  U2 (2)
The rst line shows the economic surplus, cost of debt and social cost of covering the rm loss
(R   ) in an operating state-owned rm. The second line economic surplus net of debt under
privatization. Finally there is the social cost of managers rents. Ceteris paribus, the ex-post
welfare falls with a higher debt repayment R. It also decreases with debt if ' > (1  '). In this
case, if the managers rent U2 was nil, there would be no point to raise debt.
We can now express the governments agency problem.
3.3 Governments program
In the rst stage, the government maximizes the expected welfare W = W1 + E [W2], where
E [f ] =
R 

f()dG() denotes the expectation operator on f . Creditors require a positive ex-ante
pay-o¤ C1 + E [C2] to participate in the state-owned rm nancing. This implies E [C2]  0 since
C1 = 0. Whereas the manager is in charge of contracting the debt with creditors, she is given no
freedom because the government can choose the equity amount E that covers the investment cost
net of debt, E = K D; and that implies an amount of debt D that creditors accept for the future
repayment R. The manager thus gets no rent: U1 = 0. Hence, it is the government that actually
chooses the debt, equity and repayment levels fD;E;Rg that entice all parties to participate in
the state-owned rms nancing.
Under asymmetric information, the government does not observe the realized cost parameter
of the state-owned rm in the second stage. The state-owned rm manager may not report her
cost parameter truthfully as she has an incentive to mimic a less e¢ cient rm. The government
must therefore design incentive compatible contracts such that she truthfully reveals her cost
information. Being uninformed about the rms cost , the government proposes a menu of
contracts fQ () ; T () ; ' ()g that species the output, transfer and default option that maximizes
its ex-post welfare E [W2]. Incentive compatibility requires that the manager reveals a cost reportb that maximizes her utility U2 under the o¤ered menu. While these contracts mitigate possible
cost over-reporting or cost padding, they create information rents and make the state-owned rm
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less attractive for the government (La¤ont, 2005, Auriol, 2006, Auriol and Blanc, 2009). Finally,
to participate, the manager requires a non-negative utility level: U2  0 8. Creditors either get
the repayment R or the right to the rms cash-ow (;Ql).
Formally, the governments program writes as follows:
max
fD;E;Rg
W =W1 + E [W 2 ] s.t. E +D = K and E [C2]  0
where
E [W 2 ] = maxfQ();T;();'()g
E [W2 (Q; T; '; U2; C2)]
s.t. b 2 max
0
U2 [;Q(
0); T (0); '(0)] (IC)
U2
h
;Q(b); T (b); '(b)i  0 (PC)
Because no party have incentives to deviate in each stage, this setting yields a sub-game perfect
equilibrium.
We make several remarks about the interpretation of the model. First, in this sub-game perfect
equilibrium, the government asks the state-owned rm to set the output and induces the ownership
structure that maximize the second stage welfare. It therefore has no incentives to change its
output, price or default decision. In other words, the second stage output and ownership structure
are immune to renegotiation. This set-up should be distinguished from the one in Cambini and
Spiegel (2015) where prices and output are not ex-post optimal and the presence of distress costs
induce price hikes. Also, it is worth being more precise on the commitment issue. The point here
is not that the government must commit not to bail out the state-owned rm ex-post. It does
implement its best option given information asymmetries. As discussed in Section 3, the point is
however that the government must not have binding commitment to bail out the rm ex-post in
debt contract guarantee clauses. Observe that, if guarantee clauses were imposed in all state-owned
companies, we would never observe state-owned rms with bankruptcy problems, which would not
match facts.
Second, while our model studies a separate set of decisions in each stage, it is obvious that
the debt level and the incentive contracts can be both decided ex-ante. The output, transfer and
default levels need simply be contingent on the cost report b. Here, again, the government may
look like committed by its incentive contracts, but this contract always yields its second stage
optimal option. Third, the manager maximizes her rent U2 given the menu of contracts o¤ered
to her. As standard in the contract theory literature, the menu of contacts is indexed on her cost
report b. In practice, such a menu is rather expressed as a "performance contract" that species
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transfer and default decisions fT; 'g as functions of the achieved output or the allowed ex-post
price. Such performance contracts were presented in Section 2 in the case of SNCF and SNCB-
NMVB.2627 In reality, cost pass-through provisions o¤er the exibility to adjust on cost variations
and are implemented with menus of price caps (Stones 2007).
Finally, the second stage of the above model focuses on a single time decision only for the sake
of exposition. Indeed, as per Baron and Besanko (1984), our analysis of the second stage may be
extended to the case where the second stage is repeated in several time periods. Those authors
show that the optimal dynamic contract is simply the repetition of the static contract if the hidden
cost parameter  is repeatedly and independently drawn from the same distribution G. In such
an extension, default may occur at any time period according to the realization of  in the time
period.
This subgame perfect equilibrium is solved backwards.
4 Output and default decisions
In the second stage the government maximizes the expected welfare subject to the rm managers
participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint. By the Revelation Principle, it can
implement a direct mechanism fQ(); T (); ' ()g where the state-owned rm truthfully reports its
cost information: b = . As usual in contract theory (see La¤ont and Martimort 2002), we can
substitute the control variable T for U2. Using (2), the governments program becomes:
max
Q();U2();'()
EW2 =
Z 

W2 (Q;'; U2; R;D) dG() (3)
subject to the incentive compatibility and participation constraints
dU2
d
= (1  ') (;Q) (4)
U2  0 (5)
The incentive compatibility constraint (4) is standard in the literature.28 It imposes that the
manager of the state-owned rm incurs a su¢ cient fall in her utility when she reports a cost higher
26The performance contracts are given by fT Q 1(q) ; ' Q 1(q)g where q is the observed output or by
fT Q 1(P 1(p)) ; ' Q 1(P 1(p)))g where p is the allowed price. Such formulation requires that Q is strictly
monotone and that T and ' are monotone functions of . It will be the case under the assumptions of this paper.
27In our case, the government has full bargaining power in this ex-post negotiation. Cambini and Spiegel (2011)
consider balanced bargaining powers of regulator and rm in the context of symmetric information.
28See La¤ont and Tirole (1993) and La¤ont and Martimort (2002). The rms optimal cost report is b() 2
maxb U2
h
;Q(b); T (b)i = maxb (;Q(b)) + T b R. Under truth revelation,  = b(), the utility is equal to
U2 [;Q(); T ()], which yields, by the envelop theorem, yields dU2=d = (;Q()).
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than her true cost. This condition is necessary and su¢ cient if Q is monotone decreasing function
of the cost parameter . This will be true under the usual condition that the hazard rate G=g
is strictly increasing, which we assume from now on. Since G() = 0; the hazard rate is nil at
. When the cost uncertainty is innitely small, the support of the distribution tends to a single
point,  ! , and the hazard rate to zero. To guarantee concavity of the above program, we
further assume that  is not too convex in Q.
To simplify the exposition, we concentrate on the situation where there exists a unique cost
threshold  such that the state-owned rm is defaulted for cost reports higher than . The
condition for such a situation is made explicit below. In this case, ' = 0 if  2 [; ] and ' = 1
for  2 (; ]. By (4), it comes that the managers utility falls from U2
 


to U2 (). Since the
rents to state-owned manager imposes a social cost U2, the government nds it optimal to set
U2 (
) = 0: Also, integrating by part the incentive condition (4), the managers expected rent can
be written as29 Z 

U2dG() =
Z 

( ) G
g
dG()
This identity expresses the governments main trade-o¤ between state-owned rms operation and
default: if the government defaults for a wider range of high cost reports, it reduces the range and
the rents of the low cost rms that benet from information rents. As a result, it raises welfare.
Using the above, the above program can then be written as
E [W2] =
Z 

W 02 (;R;D) dG() +
Z 

W 12 (;D) dG() (6)
where
W 02 (;R;D) = max
Q

N(Q) + (;Q) D    [R  (;Q)] + G
g
(;Q)

(7)
and
W 12 (;D)  N(Qm) + (;Qm) D:
The ex-post welfare has the same structure as (2). The termW 02 includes the economic surplus, the
cost of the debt, the social cost of covering the rm loss (R ) in the operating state-owned rm.
It includes an additional term related to information rents,  (G=g) . The termW 12 includes the
economic surplus and debt under default.
29Indeed, one computes
R 

U2dG() =
R 

U2gd = [U2G]

  
R 

dU2
d Gd =  
R 

(1  ') Gd =
  R 

(1  ')  (G=g)dG() since G() = 0 and U2
 


= U2 (
) = 0.
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4.1 Output decision
The optimal output Q of the state-owned rm is given by the FOC w.r.t. Q of the objective in
(7):
(NQ + Q) + Q + 
G
g
Q = 0: (8)
Under our assumptions, the LHS of condition (8) is decreasing functions of Q so that the condition
yields a maximum. Four comments are in order.
First, in the absence of shadow cost of public funds ( = 0), the government cares only
about the economic surplus. The transfers between the Treasury, rm and manager imply income
redistribution but does not a¤ect its utilitarian objective. Then, the government asks the rm to
implement the output that maximizes the economic surplus: Qe = arg maxQ(N + ). Second, in
the presence of a shadow cost of public funding ( > 0) and in the absence of cost uncertainty
(G=g = 0), the government balances the marginal increase in economic surplus and the social cost
of subsidizing production (Q). In the limit where  ! 1, the government cares only about the
dividend it can tap from the state-owned rm and asks to implement the laissez-faire monopoly level
Qm(), which solves Q = 0. Third, in the presence of a shadow cost of public funding ( > 0) and
cost uncertainty (G=g > 0), the government also considers the social cost of information extraction
((G=g)Q). Di¤erentiating totally expression (8), it can be checked that the optimal output Q
decreases with the cost parameter  as well as the shadow cost of public funds, . Higher cost
parameters reduce the economic surplus and necessitates a smaller production level. Higher costs
of public funds inate the social cost of transfers to the rm and lead to a reduction in output for
two reasons: one the one hand, it increases revenues and yields higher dividends to the Treasury
or lower losses to recoup, on the other hand, it distorts output downward to lower the managers
incentive to mimic higher cost rms and therefore reduce information rents. Finally, observe that,
instead of setting the output level, the government may set the market ex-post price such that
p = P (Q). As a result, higher cost parameters and costs of public funds lead to higher prices.
Financially distressed government are then expected to allow higher prices in state-owned rms
because they put higher social value on transfers to the Treasury and are therefore less incline to
accept high information rents.
4.2 Default decision
The optimal decision to default is given by the threshold  that maximizes E [W2]. From (6),
it is clear that the government defaults the state-owned rm if and only if the ex-post welfare
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advantage of state-owned rm,
W2(;R)  W 02 (;R;D) W 12 (;D) (9)
is negative. This expression falls with the debt repayment R but it is independent of debt D
because debt is always paid back to the capital market. To verify that the default threshold  is
unique as assumed above, W2(;R) must cross the horizontal axis at most once and from above
as  rises. A su¢ cient condition is that W2(;R) falls with .30 That is,
dW2
d
=

(1 + )(;Q
) + 
d
d

G
g


 

(;Q
m) +NQ(Q
m)
dQm
d

< 0: (10)
This condition reects the balance in the welfare losses in the state-owned and privatized rms. It
includes the e¤ect of information extraction in the state-owned rm and the allocative ine¢ ciency
in the defaulted rm. To our knowledge, the sign of expression (10) is ambiguous for general prot
functions and parameter distributions. It is however negative for linear demand and linear cost
functions and uniform cost parameter distributions (see Appendix B). By continuity, the condition
is fullled for neither too convex nor too concave demand functions. There exist many other classes
of prot functions and parameter distributions that also satisfy this condition. To highlight the
general properties of the model, we maintain the above general formulation of economic surpluses
and rent rather than specialize to a specic class of surplus and prot functions that satisfy the
above condition.
Under condition (10), there exists a unique optimal default threshold  that solvesW2(; R) =
0:Moreover, the default threshold  decreases with repayment levelsR as d=dR =   (@W2=@R)
= (@W2=@) < 0. This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under condition (10), there exists a unique optimal default threshold (R) such
that the government defaults if and only if   (R). The threshold  is a decreasing function
in R. This property holds for any combination of linear or iso-elastic demands, linear costs and
uniform or Pareto distributions.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Under the structure of this optimal default threshold, there exist two repayment levels R and
R such that rms are never defaulted when R < R, only the rms with cost in the range (; ]
are defaulted when R 2 [R;R], and rms nally are always defaulted when R > R. The latter
30This condition is su¢ cient. For many specications, the same default structure is optimal even when this
condition is not satised.
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situation is actually equivalent to privatize the rm for any cost realization. The government
therefore has the option unconditionally to privatize the state-owned rm by setting R > R in the
rst stage.
We are now equipped to discuss the debt and equity transfer decision that the government
makes in the rst stage.
5 Debt and equity decisions
In the rst stage no party has information about the cost parameter. The government maximizes
its expected welfare subject to the rm managers and creditors participation constraints and
subject to the output, transfer and default decisions made in the second stage.
5.1 Expected welfare
The expected welfare is given by W  W1 + E [W2] ; or equivalently,
W =   (1 + )E +
Z (R)

W 02 (;R;D) dG() +
Z 
(R)
W 12 (;D) dG()
Using the amount of equity E = K   D and changing the integration boundaries, this can be
written as
W =   (1 + ) (K  D) +
Z 

W 02 (;R;D) dG() 
Z 
(R)
W2(;R) dG() (11)
where W2 is presented in (9).
The expected welfare includes three elements: the social value of rst stage equity injection,
the expected value of ex-post welfare under state-ownership and the expected loss or benet of
letting the state-owned rm default.
Because rents to creditors have a social cost, the government nds it optimal to inject equity
such that creditors are indi¤erent to the debt contract: E [C2] = 0: This implies that the debt level
is equal to the expected value of repayment and prot after defaulting:
D = RG [ (R)] +
Z 

(;Qm) dG() (12)
In Section 5.4, we will show that repayments R are always higher than the operating prots
(;Qm) of defaulted rms,  2 (; ]. The second term in the RHS of (12) is therefore smaller
than R [1 G ()]. This implies that the debt D is always lower than the repayment R made by
the state-owned rm.
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Using expression (12) and the fact that W 02 (;R;D) = W
0
2 (; 0; 0)   R   D; we can write
the above expression in the following form:
W =   (1 + )K+
Z 

W 02 (; 0; 0) dG() 
Z 
(R)
fW2(;R) +  [(;Qm) R]g dG() (13)
Hence, the expected welfare is broken down in three parts: the social cost of funding the project, the
expected welfare of the undefaulted state-owned rm and the expected loss or gain of defaulting.
The two rst parts are independent of the debt and repayment levels while the last one may a
priori depend on the repayment level. The last term not only includes the loss of the second stage
ex-post welfare W2 - as discussed above - but also the social benet of contracting a debt in
the rst stage  [(;Qm) R]. Using W2(;R) = W2(; 0)  R, the integrand in the above
third term simplies to
V ()  W2(; 0) + (;Qm)
which is actually independent of the repayment level R. Importantly, it is also a decreasing function
of  since
dV
d
=
dW2
d
+ 
d
d
(;Qm)  0
Indeed, the second term is equal to  and therefore negative while the rst term is also negative
under condition (10). Furthermore, we can make explicit the components of this expression as
V () =

N(Q) + (1 + )(;Q) + 
G
g
(;Q
)

  [N(Qm) + (1 + )(;Qm)] (14)
This measures the ex-post welfare di¤erence between the state-owned rm and laissez-faire pro-
duction for each cost parameter . It is a counterfactual value because the second square bracketed
term measures the ex-post welfare that the government would obtain if it were to ask to implement
the laissez-faire output. Expression (14) is positive in the three following cases: for the lowest cost
parameter ( = ), in the absence of information asymmetry (G=g = 0), in the absence of cost of
public funds ( = 0). In any case, the term with G=g vanishes and the bracketed terms in (14)
encompass the objective N + (1 + ) that is evaluated at its maximizing output Q and at the
laissez-faire output Qm. The rst term is therefore larger than the second. Hence, it can be stated
that V falls in  from a positive value at  =  and has at most one intersection with the zero
axis. By contrast, it becomes negative for very high cost of public fund (!1): This is because
the second bracketed term in (14) is the maximum of the prot function  which is larger than
the objective included the rst term  + G
g
. Those important properties will be used below.
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5.2 Optimal debt and equity
From the above, the expected welfare is a function of the repayment level R. It has three regimes.
First, for low repayment levels R < R, the debt is always paid back so that (R) = . The
expected welfare is then given by the constant
W0 =   (1 + )K +
Z 


N(Q) + (1 + )(;Q) + 
G
g
(;Q
)

dG() (15)
where we plugged the value of W 02 (; 0; 0). This balances the investment cost and the second
stage welfare with state-owned rm production. Second, for high repayment levels R > R, the
rm is always defaulted and privatized so that (R) < . The expected welfare is equal to
W0   R 

V ()dG(), which is also constant. Finally, for intermediate repayment levels R 2
[R;R], the expected welfare is given by
W (R) =W0  
Z 
(R)
V ()dG() (16)
Because d=dR < 0, this implies that
dW
dR
= V ()g()
d
dR
 0 () V ()  0
We know that V () falls with higher cost parameters  from a positive value at  = (R) to
(possibly) negative values. Yet, if V
 


< 0; there exists a unique root e 2 (; ) such that
V () = 0 and there exists an associated repayment eR 2 (R;R) such that e = ( eR). Then, if
R < eR, V ( (R)) is negative and expected welfare rises with higher R. Otherwise, it is positive
and expected welfare falls. In other words, the expected welfare reaches a maximum at eR. The
debt level eD is then given by (12), evaluated at R = eR. By contrast, if V   > 0; the expected
welfare always falls with repayments in the interval [R;R] so that zero repayment and zero debt
levels are optimal.
Figure 2 displays numerical examples with linear demand and cost and with uniform cost
distribution. It plots the debt level and ex-ante welfare for several values of shadow costs of public
funds. Optimal expected welfare, repayment, debt levels are denoted by a small circle. The gure
conrms the existence of optimal debt as stated in the above proposition. For  = 0:3, the ex-ante
welfare is maximal at R = D = 0 so that the government has no incentives to ask the rm to
take debt (see small circle to the left of each panel). For higher , the maximal ex-ante welfare is
obtained for positive values of R. For instance for  = 0:6, the repayment is equal to eR = 0:194
and the debt can be computed as eD = 0:179, which implies a return on investment of 8% for the
creditors (0:194=0:179  1). The debt is also positive and higher for  = 1 and  = 2.
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We summarize this main nding in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under condition (10), debt increases expected welfare and the state-owned rm
borrows if V () < 0. If so, there exist two unique thresholds e and eR solving V (e) = 0 and
( eR) = e so that the state-owned rm is asked to issue a positive debt eD. Otherwise, debt is not
used.
Proposition 2 is our main result. It states that debt can be used as an instrument to reduce
information rents in state-owned rms. The borrowing decision is the result of a trade-o¤ between
economic surplus, shadow cost of public funds and information rents. To make this clear we can
look at the case without information asymmetry. In the absence of information asymmetry, we
have G=g = 0 and therefore V ()  0 8 2 [; ]. So, expected welfare falls with R 2 [R;R]
and is constant for other repayment levels. It therefore is always optimal to set zero repayment
and debt. This is a reminiscence of the fact that unconstrained and benevolent governments
cannot do worse than the market outcomes as they can always replicate the market outcomes.
The use of external borrowing is never socially optimal in the absence of asymmetric information.
This is congruent with the irrelevance of the cost-of-funds argument obtained for concession
contracts under symmetric information by Engel et al.s (2013). Yet, when governments have
limited information, they are unable to do so and they balance information rents with the cost of
public funds and allocative ine¢ ciencies. This gives the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Debt contracts are never optimal in the absence of information asymmetry.
Note that when state-owned rms default, they reduce their production. Production indeed
become lower because defaulted rms have higher costs and set uncontrolled prices. The govern-
ment is also indi¤erent to defaulting a marginal state-owned rm with cost b. If it defaults the
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latter, it accepts a fall in production and therefore a rise in price. This results in a loss in consumer
surplus, which is compensated by shutting subsidy payments to the state-owned rm.
Corollary 4 Production is lower in defaulted rms. The production of the rm with cost b falls
if it is defaulted.
Proof. See Appendix B.
5.3 Cost of public funds
The shadow cost of public funds has a key e¤ect on the incentives to make state-owned rms
borrow. A higher  raises the governments incentive to reduce transfers from the Treasury. To
diminish transfers and their information rent content, the government makes the state-owned rm
default at lower cost realizations. This strategy can be implemented by setting higher repayment
and debt levels. To show this, we can look at the situation with or without cost of public funds.
First, in the absence of cost of public funds ( = 0), the debt is not optimal because V ()
has been shown to be positive 8 2 [; ]. The government cares only about the economic surplus
and puts no social cost on the transfers between the parties. Information rents do not make it to
distort output and prices and do not entice it to increase the debt leverage in order to increase
the state-owned rm managers incentive to report truthfully. As a result, debt contracts are not
optimal in the absence of shadow cost of public funds and therefore for nancially unconstrained
governments. This phenomenon may explain why most of the federally-, state- or city-owned rms
in the developed economies borrow directly from their own government and therefore use the public
funding capabilities for their investments. (e.g. Amtrak, see Table 1.)
By contrast, the last conclusion is reversed when the government faces a very tough budget
constraint (say  ! 1). In this case, the government is only interested in collecting the state-
owned rms dividends and avoiding to equity injection. As we have shown above, V ()  0
8 2 [; ] for  ! 1. Hence, the expected welfare rises with larger R in the interval [R;R]
and the government chooses a repayment level such that R > R. As the state-owned rm is
never able to repay this amount in the second stage, the government actually commits in the
rst stage to privatize the project in the second stage. More precisely, the government makes the
investment K and directly sells (or auction) the project to an external party (here, the creditors)
for the amount D equal to the expected laissez-faire prot
R 

(;Qm) dG(). By doing this, it
avoids the information rents in the agency problem with the state-owned rms manager. The
government has an incentive to do so if the expected laissez-faire prot is larger than K. In this
case the investment cost K is fully covered by the private party.
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In Appendix B, we generalize those results by showing that d eD=d > 0, d eR=d > 0 and
de=d < 0. The following corollary summarizes those results:
Proposition 5 There exist two cost thresholds of public funds ( and ,  < ) such that debt
contracts are not used when governments have weak nancial constraints ( < ). For more
nancially constrained governments (   < ), the debt, repayment and default probability are
positive and rise with higher cost of public funds. Governments under high nancial constraints
(  ) choose to privatize and auction the project at the outset.
Proposition 5 helps understanding the existence of a positive relationship between prices and
debt when costs of public funds change. Indeed, by (8) and (17), both prices and debt levels
rises with stronger information asymmetry. Indeed, when the hazard ratio G=g becomes higher,
the government has incentives to ask smaller output and higher prices (see (8)) at the same time
as it is willing to inject a smaller amount of rst stage equity, leading to higher repayments and
debts (see (17)). This implies that debt and price levels move in the same direction in regulated
industries because of heterogeneity in cost of public funds. There is no causality between debt
and prices. This is consistent with Bortolotti et al.s (2011) empirical ndings that suggest that
leverage and prices are correlated in regulated industries but that reject any causality e¤ects in
the case state-owned companies (see their Tables VIII and XI, columns 7).
Corollary 6 State-owned rmsprices and debt leverages are positively correlated.
5.4 Transfers
A natural question arises about the transfer value at which the government stops subsidizing or
reinjecting equity in the state-owned rm. We here show that transfers increase with reported
cost parameters and that government lets the state-owned rm default when the transfer becomes
higher than a specic positive amount.
The transfer to state-owned rm with cost parameter  2 [; e] is equal to
T () = eR  (;Q) + U2
That is, the government matches the gap between the debt repayment and operational prot plus
the managers information rent. This transfer increases with higher cost parameter . Indeed,
after di¤erentiating and simplifying, we get
T 0() =  QdQ

d
> 0
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which is positive because the optimal output Q is a decreasing function of  and the marginal
prots Q are positive at Q (Qm  Q). Hence, it becomes more costly for the Treasury to
support higher cost rms and the government stops reinjecting cash for cost parameters above e.
As seen above, the cost and repayment thresholds (e; eR) are determined by the second stage
optimality condition  = (R), which is the solution of the identity W2(;R) = 0; and the
rst stage optimality condition V () = 0, which is a short-cut notation for the integrand of
(13), namely, W2(;R) +  [(;Qm) R] = 0. Therefore, at the optimal cost and repayment
thresholds (e; eR), it must be that eR = (e;Qm) (17)
In words, the cost parameter e that makes the government indi¤erent to default or not also makes
the creditors indi¤erent to take over the rm or not. Because (;Qm) falls with higher , this
is the highest prot level in defaulted rms and creditors always earn less than the repayment
amount promised in the debt contract ( > e). As mentioned above, this implies that the debt is
always smaller than the associated repayment. Indeed, by (12), we get
eD = eRGe+ Z e (;Qm) dG()
< eRGe+ eR h1 G(e)i
= eR
The transfer to state-owned rm with this cost parameter e is equal to T (e) = eR   (e;Q)
because its managers utility is set to her participation constraint (U2(e) = 0). Substituting for
the above result, this specic transfer can be written as
T (e) = (e;Qm)  (e;Q)
which is positive because Qm yields the maximal value of operational prots. Because T increases
in , this is the highest amount of equity injection or subsidy that the government is willing to
put in the state-owned rm to avoid a default. The important point is that T (e) > 0. That is, the
government relinquishes the state-owned rm only if the latter needs the government to meet its
debt repayment obligation. It has no incentive to relinquish its ownership of a state-owned rm
that meets its debt obligation.
Proposition 7 The optimal repayment is equal to the highest prot level in defaulted rms. The
ex-post transfers from the government rise with higher cost reports. When cost reports imply too
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high transfers, the government does not help the state-owned rm covering its debt obligation and
lets it default.
6 Discussion
To our knowledge the role of information and debt in state-owned enterprises has not been high-
lighted in the literature. We want to make several remarks.
First, our analysis carries over a continuous set of types. This contrasts with a body of contract
theory applications that focus on two-type models for simplicity purposes. However, as it must
now be clear, the discussion of optimal debt requires the assessment of a range of types with
binding participation constraints (U2() = 0). To be relevant, a discrete-type model would require
three cost types: one that never participates, one that participates depending on debt levels and
one that always participates. Such a three-type model is not simpler and more general than the
present model. They would further impose the discussion of cost distributions with three modes,
which is even less realistic. We believe that the condition (10) imposed in our continuous type
model is no more restrictive than the simplifying assumption of discrete types. The model accepts
analytical solutions for combinations of linear or iso-elastic demands, linear costs and uniform or
Pareto distributions, which is the realm of contract theory models.
Second, note that the debt contract is a part of an ex-ante mechanism that includes an output
contract. Debt is not only used for the purpose of nancing the investment as it is usual in nance.
Besides reducing socially costly subsidies, it is used to alter the public management s participation
constraint and diminish monitoring costs. Debt makes high cost rms fail and default so that there
is no point for non-defaulting rms to report high cost as well. Debt therefore reduces the extent
of their information rents. The mechanism presented here is not (necessarily) optimal as one
might replace the debt contract by an option, warrant, etc.31 This is the case of TVA that o¤ers
convertible bonds (see Section 2). However, in our opinion, a debt contract more closely ts real
distress situations of state-owned rms and highlights an uncovered feature of debt structure of
state-owned companies.
Finally, the present model focuses on the case of (local) natural monopoly markets served
by state-owned companies that sell their output to consumers. This ts the markets for water,
railways, etc. Actually, the properties of the model depends only the existence of a consumer net
surplus N(Q), production surplus (;Q), economic surplus N(Q) + (;Q), and information
31For instance, one may add ex-post subsidies to the privatized rm as in Auriol and Picard (2009). One may
also replace the debt by an option.
32
rents (G=g) (;Q), and a performance contract fQ; T; 'g. Our results do not directly rely on
the existence of a market price P (Q) for goods or services. The model may therefore be generalized
to other situations. For instance, the model can be interpreted as one of (public) good provision by
a state-owned rm with a performance contract fQ; T; 'g where Q is the veriable quality of the
good provided and  the production cost of quality unit. The same conclusion about debt leverage
can be obtained provided that the economic and prot surplus functions share the concavity and
single crossing properties assumed in the paper.
7 Conclusion
In this article, we examine the role of private debt contracts in inducing cost revelation and
improving the welfare of state-owned rms. We nd that, debt leverage may enhance welfare when
the state-owned rm has private information. The government then balances the information
cost that must be paid to have the state-owned rm truthfully report its costs and the loss in
consumer surplus when the government loses control over production and prices after it defaults
and privatizes the state-owned rm. We show that the debt contract allows the government to
reduce subsidies and information rents by defaulting the rm. We show that the optimal debt level
increases when the cost of public funds rises.
In this text, we also present a set of case studies illustrating state-owned rmsstrong indebt-
edness, mostly in developed countries and transition economies. The literature review presented
by Megginson and Netter (2001) also highlights higher debt leverages in state-owned rms before
their privatization in non-transition economies. Our analysis conrms the existence of strong in-
centives for high debt leverage and privatization in the state-owned rms operating in developing
countries. Such countries indeed have large costs of public funds due to weak tax systems and
large informal sectors (Auriol and Warlters, 2012). Casual facts support that view as, for instance,
many African cases of privatization turned out to be liquidations (Sarbib 1997). However, to our
knowledge, there is no systematic empirical research on the role of state-owned rmsdebt in devel-
oping countries. Whereas such a research agenda is welcome, it will be needed to disentangle the
incentives to recourse to outside nance with the disincentive created by the bad credit institutions
in developing countries.
Our model revisits Baron and Myersons (1982) and La¤ont and Tiroles (1993) views of regu-
lated rms and asymmetric information in the context of debt contracts. For the sake of concise-
ness, the paper discards the nonetheless important issues of moral hazard, regulatory opportunism,
complementary tasks, information asymmetries between creditors and private manager. But those
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have been extensively discussed in the recent literature. The model can nevertheless readily be
extended to the issues of corporate taxation, private cost of capital, foreign creditors and auditing
costs whereas the introduction of price cap after privatization is a more di¢ cult task (see Appen-
dix C). The paper leaves room for further discussion on information and coordination costs in the
bankruptcy process (Gale and Hellwig, 1985) or in a subsequent privatization auction (Arozamena
and Weinschelbaum, 2006 and 2009, Burguet and Perry, 2007). Finally, it might be important
to generalize the debt contract. For example, it may include the possibility of the creditors (or
external investors) exercising an option that gives them the right to pay a price and take control
and management of the state-owned rm. There may be a role for the introduction of convertible
bonds where the ownership structure changes in case of low prot realizations.
Recent empirical works have attached importance on the role of outside nance in state-owned
rms and/or PPPs (e.g. Bortolotti et al., 2011). However, several theories concur to explain the
relationship between leverage and other observables. de Bettignies and Ross (2009) emphasize
the role of politiciansre-election incentives, Cambini and Spiegel (2015) the role of regulators
opportunism, Iossa and Martimort (2015) the importance of creditorsinformation and expertise
and this paper the role of information rents in state-owned rms. In the future, empirical research
shall help disentangling between those theories that explain the role of debt in state-owned rms.
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Appendix A: Case study references
In this appendix we present the references to the sources used in our case studies. Those include
annual reports, company statutes, compant websites and press articles.
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Online. Factiva. (October 2016)
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garo. 1 June 2010. Online. Factiva.
(October 2016)
[7] ""Le sujet est clos" sur le statut de la SNCF, assure M. Pépy". Agence France Presse. 2 June
2010. Online. Factiva. (October 2016)
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Echos. 16 July 2015. Online. Factiva. (October 2016)
Deutsche Bahn
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[5] Annual Report 2016. http://www1.deutschebahn.com/ecm2-db-en/ir/nancial_reports/
[6] "Deutsche Bahn to be partially privatised by 2009". Agence France Presse. 8 November 2006.
[7] "German Govt 09 New Debt Goal Raised To EUR18.5B". Dow Jones International News. 21
November 2008.
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[1] Rapport de gestion 2014.http://www.belgianrail.be/fr/corporate/sous-la-loupe/~/media/
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2013014495#top
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Tendances. 21 January 2016. Online. Factiva. (October 2016)
[5] "Perspective dune privatisation de la SNCB". Agence Belga. 27 Novembre 2014. Online.
Factiva. (October 2016)
Amtrak
[1] Amtrak National Facts, Amtrak, www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename
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[2] Amtrak. 2014 annual report of Amtrak. Retrieved fromwww.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We show that W2(;R) is a decreasing function of  for the classes of models with linear costs,
Pareto and uniform distribution and linear or iso-elastic demand functions. Let us normalize  = 0
so that  2 [0; ], which does not change our results. We assume Pareto cumulative distribution
function G() = (=) where  > 0 so that we conveniently have G=g = =. The distribution
is uniform if  = 1.
Consider rst the linear inverse demand functions P (Q) = a   bQ where a and b are positive
scalars. Normalizing prices and output appropriately, we can restrict our study to the function
P (Q) = 1 Q under the condition that P (0)   ()  2 [0; 1]. In this case, S(Q) = Q Q2=2,
N(Q) = Q2=2 and (;Q) = (1      Q)Q: The default output is equal to Qm = (1   )=2 and
state-owned rms output is computed as
Q = (1  )

1 + 
1 + 2

1  1


1 + 

1  

which is a decreasing function of  and which restricts  to be lower than (1 + ) = (1 + + =) to
keep non negative output Q. Using the rst order condition (8) applied to this linear demand, we
can writeN(Q)+(1+)(;Q)+ (G=g) (;Q) = 12(1+2) (Q
)2 whileN(Qm)+(;Qm) =
3
2
(Qm)2. Hence,
W2(;R) =
1
2
(1  )2
"
(1 + )2
1 + 2

1  1


1 + 

1  
2
  3
4
#
  R (18)
where both terms fall in . So, W2(;R) is a decreasing function of . As a consequence, for
any repayment R > 0, there will exist a unique threshold (R) such that W2(;R) = 0. This
threshold is decreasing in R.
Consider now the iso-elastic inverse demand functions P (Q) = AQ 1=", where we can also
normalize the constantA to one. The default output is equal toQm = (em)
 " where em = "=(" 1)
and the state-owned rms output is computed as Q = (e) " where here e  "(1 +  + =)=
[1+(1+)(" 1)]. So, Q is a decreasing function of . We compute W2(;R) = W 2 1 " R
where
W 2 
 
e1 "   e1 "m

[1 + + 1=("  1)]  (1 + )(e "   e "m )  e "=+ e "m = ("  1) (19)
One can show that W 2 is positive for low enough parameters " and  and negative otherwise.
As a result, if W 2 > 0, there will exist a unique threshold 
(R) such that W2(;R) = 0: This
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threshold is equal to (R) = (R=W 2 )
1=(1 "), which is decreasing in R. Otherwise, if W 2  0,
W2(;R) is always negative for R  0 and the government chooses to privatize for all . So,
(R) = 0. Intuitively, a high demand elasticity " or a high shadow cost of public funds  reduces
governments concern about consumer surplus and its welfare cost of privatization, which entices
it to privatize anyway.
Proof of Corollary 4
We rst show that Q(e)  Qm(e). Let us dene the welfare objective F (Q)  N(Q)+ (1 + )
(;Q). This is a function that increases on the interval [0; Q] where Qm  Q. Using (14),
V (e) = 0 is equivalent to F [Q]  F [Qm] =  G
g
(;Q
) > 0 where is evaluated at  = e.
Therefore F
h
Q(e)i > F hQm(e)i () Q(e)  Qm(e), which is true.
Second, we show that production is lower in defaulted rms. That is, Q(0)  Qm(00) for
any 0  e  00. This is true because Q(0) > Q(e) for 0 < e, Q(e)  Qm(e) and
Qm(e) > Qm(00) for e < 00.
Proof of Proposition 5
First, we get de=d =   (dV=d) = (dV=d) < 0 because dV=d < 0 and dV=d =
[(;Q) + (G=g)(;Q)]   (;Qm) < 0. Indeed, we have (;Qm)  (;Q) > (;Q)+
(G=g)(;Q) for any Q because  < 0. Second, by (17), we get d eR=d = (e;Qm)de=d > 0.
Finally, d eD=d > 0 because eD lies on the upward sloping section of (12).
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Appendix C: Extensions
In this Appendix, we shortly expand the model to explain the role of the investment cost, corporate
taxes, price cap, private cost of capital and time discounting and nally the impact of foreign
creditors.
Investment costs
In our analysis, the optimal debt level eD( eR) depends on the state-owned rms ability to meet its
repayment commitment eR. This ability is inuenced by the rms capacity to generate prots and
therefore on its product demand and cost parameter distribution. It is however not related to the
investment cost K. So, what can be the impact of this cost on our previous discussion?
If the optimal debt level is lower than the investment cost ( eD( eR) < K), the state-owned rm
is limited in its ability to raise funds and the government is obliged to contribute to the equity
for an amount of E = K   eD( eR) > 0. In this case our analysis remains the same. By contrast,
if the optimal debt level is higher than the investment cost ( eD( eR) > K), the state-owned rm
is able to raise more than its investment cost. This leads to two possibilities. On the one hand,
the government may inject negative equity into the state-owned rm, meaning that it collectseD( eR)   K in the rst stage and saves on public funding for the same amount. In that case our
analysis is also unchanged. On the other hand, the investment cost K may consist of a cap on the
borrowing possibilities. This can be motivated by moral hazard issues that are not modeled here:
the infrastructure is the only physical asset that the creditors can seize and that is pledgeable. In
such a situation, the optimal debt is constrained to eD(R) = K. This gives a maximum repayment
R equal to eD 1(K). The introduction of this moral hazard constraint shifts the debt level fromeD( eR) to K.
Corporate taxes
In most countries, privatized rms are subject to corporate taxes. The introduction of such tax can
readily be included in our analysis with little analytical e¤ort. Indeed, suppose that a corporate
tax rate  is imposed on the defaulted and privatized rm. Ex-post, the welfare is augmented by
the amount  (;Qm) in all default situations which are evaluated at the shadow cost . The tax
does not change the welfare in state-owned rms. This clearly gives an additional advantage to
the default option and reduces the cost parameters at which the government chooses to liquidate
the rm. More formally, the presence of the corporate tax decreases the welfare advantage W2
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by the amount  (;Qm) and therefore shifts the schedule (R). In addition, the creditors
utility C2 is also reduced by the tax  (;Qm) in such situations. Creditors are therefore willing
to lend a smaller amount of debt equal to the sum of the decrease in expected repayment and value
of this tax. However, all in all, the corporate tax has no e¤ect on the welfare evaluated at the debt
level that entices lending from creditors. Formally, V () is unchanged and the threshold cost e
remains the same. The expected welfare is unchanged. Intuitively, the decrease in creditor utility
and the welfare impact of a lower debt level acceptable by creditors are exactly balanced by the
public gain from tax revenues.
Finally, note that the optimal repayment eR is given by e = ( eR), which is independent of
tax. Therefore, because (R) falls in R, it must be that the introduction of the corporate tax
diminishes the repayment level eR. Since the tax increases the ex-post incentives to default, the
government reduces repayment levels to restore the same default likelihood. This naturally entices
creditors to accept smaller debt levels; indeed, the maximum debt level that entices lending from
creditors decreases exactly by the amount  eRGe + R e  (;Qm) dG () where  eR denotes
the fall in repayment. To sum up, the introduction of a corporate tax decreases the debt and
repayment levels. It does not a¤ect the default policy and the expected welfare.
Price cap
In analogy to corporate taxes, the government can introduce a price cap to limit the creditors
prots when they get ownership of the rm. By the same token it will raise the consumer surplus
when the state-owned rm is defaulted. However, a general study of the e¤ect of a price cap
raises additional issues. First, it requires a discussion about the rms costs at which the price
cap will bind or not and the costs at which the creditors may shut production. In the latter case,
the creditors will certainly renegotiate the price cap with the government. Second, it raises the
question of what the optimal price cap is. We do not intend to make such a detailed discussion here.
However, as in Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Cambini and Spiegel (2015), we can give insights by
assuming an exogenous price cap that is high enough to avoid the threat of a production shutdown.
This occurs for instance if the price cap is set equal to or higher than the highest cost under default.
In this case, the default production under the price cap is given by the schedule Qc() where
Qc()  Qm() for   e. Our previous analysis can then be replicated by replacing the laissez-
faire output Qm() with this production schedule Qc(). In particular the welfare di¤erence func-
tions W2 and V must now include Qc() instead of Qm() and are a¤ected for cost parameters
higher than the default threshold e. We readily get the following neutrality result when the price
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cap binds only for some defaulted rms; that is, for those rms with the highest cost realizations.
Then, the price cap does not bind for the defaulted rms with cost  close to e. Remember that
the optimal cost and repayment level, e and eR, are given at the roots of the two functions W2
and V . At the threshold  = e, the production is given by Qc(e) = Qm(e). As a result, the
functions W2 and V do not change about  = e and R = eR and thus accept exactly the same
roots. So, we may conclude that the introduction of a price cap that binds only for some defaulted
rms does not a¤ect the governments default policy and its choice for the repayment level. The
price cap however negatively a¤ects the creditors expected return from lending and entices them
to lend a lower debt level. It also a¤ects expected welfare because the price cap binds for defaulted
rms with higher costs, which entices them to produce more, generate higher consumer surplus
and decrease their prots.
When the price cap binds for all cost parameters of defaulted rms, the debt and repayment
levels can unfortunately not be so easily predicted.32
Private borrowing costs and time discounting
Our model may be extended to account for the time discounting and the creditorsprivate cost
of nancing in the capital market. In this case, the creditors must repay D(1 + ) in the capital
market in the second stage whereas the welfare rises by (1 + )D in the rst stage. The creditors
accept a debt up to the amount where (1 + )D = RG () +
R 
 (;Q
m)dG. Our results
nevertheless remain the same when all parties are endowed with the same discount factor  2 (0; 1]
and when the latter is related to the private cost of nancing  by the relationship  = 1=(1 + ).
To show this point, consider the case where repayments are low (R < R),. Then, the expected
welfare is equal to the constant W0 in expression (15) plus the following three terms: (1 + )D+
 [R  (1 + )D]   (1 + )R. The rst term expresses the government saving on equity injection
in the rst stage, which is valued at the shadow cost of public funds. The second term expresses
the present value of creditorsutility, given their cash inow from repayment and outow to the
capital market in the second stage.33 The last term represents the present value of the socially
costly repayments as foregone revenues to the government in the second stage. In this case, the
debt is always paid back and creditors accept the debt level such that (1+)D = R. Then the three
terms simplify to  D (1 + ) [(1 + )   1]. When the discount factor is equal to  = 1=(1 + ),
32Since creditors expect less prots in the event of a liquidation, they will reduce their acceptable debt level.
However, at the same time, the price cap raises the second stage welfare of all defaulted rms, including those with
cost  close to b, which incentivices the government to decrease (R) and default the rm more often.
33Recall the creditorsutility in the rst stage is C1 = D  D = 0.
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this expression cancels out so that debt has no impact on the expected welfare. As a consequence,
our previous analysis applies. However, the discount factor  may be greater than 1=(1 + ) if the
private cost of nancing  includes any additional feature such as transaction costs, capital market
risk premium, etc. In this case the expected welfare falls with D or equivalently with R. The
repayment and debt are therefore avoided by the government because a too high capital market
rate  represents a leakage to the capital market.
For higher repayment levels R 2 [R;R], the expected welfare is computed as expression (16)
plus the same term   eD(R) (1 + ) [(1 + )   1]. Again when  = 1=(1 + ), this term cancels.
Because W2 and V () are independent of  and , e and eR do not change so that debt
has no impact on the expected welfare. Again, our previous analysis applies. However, when
 > 1=(1+), the too high private cost of nancing represents a leakage to the capital market that
the government wants to avoid. The government has therefore an incentive to reduce the value of
debt and repayment as  increases. For  above but close to (1  )=, one can show that a rise in
 decreases the debt level. Figure 3 depicts the optimal debt for various private costs of nancing,
 > 0, and for a discount factor,  = 1. The picture is built using a model with linear demand
and cost, (;Q) = (1 Q)Q  Q; and uniform distribution of cost parameter,  2 [0; 1=2]. As
expected, it shows that optimal debt levels increase with the shadow cost of public funds and fall
with the private costs of nancing.
Figure 3: Debt vs social cost of public funds.
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Foreign creditors
In many countries the state-owned rms borrow from various domestic and foreign sources of
funding. The presence of foreign creditors alters our analysis by the fact that the government is
unlikely to consider their utility in its decision to default the rm. In this case, it accounts only
for the utility of domestic creditors in its welfare evaluation. If we denote the share of domestic
creditors by  2 [0; 1], the welfare function must then include the terms C1 and C2 instead of
C1 and C2. Interestingly, the presence of foreign creditors has no e¤ect on the optimal debt level.
To see this, remember that the optimal repayment level is set to eR = (e;Qm(e)) when all
creditors were domestic (see (17)). At the cost and repayment level, e and eR, W2 and V are
both equal to zero. Now consider the presence of foreign creditors,  < 1. It reduces the ex-post
welfare of the state-owned rm W 02 by the utility of the foreign creditors, (1   )(R   D), and
it also reduces the default option W 12 by their utility level, (1   )((;Qm)   D). The welfare
advantage of the state-owned rm W2 therefore is increased by the di¤erence between those
utility levels, (1  )(R   (;Qm)), which is exactly zero at  = e and R = eR. Hence, whereas
W2 is altered by , its root is unchanged. This means that the presence of foreign creditors does
not change the governments default strategy. It can further be shown that the share of foreign
creditors does not a¤ect the di¤erence V . As a consequence, repayment and debt levels are also
unchanged. Intuitively, the governments default policy depends on the welfare assessment of the
marginal state-owned rm with cost  = e. Since at this cost, creditors have the same utility
under the two options, it makes no di¤erence whether the government includes their utility in its
welfare assessment.
Bankruptcy and auditing cost
In our model we have assumed that the creditors are able to obtain information about the rms
at no cost at the default stage. We can briey discuss the extension whereby creditors incur
a xed cost of audit or bankruptcy, , when the rm is defaulted. This xed cost captures
the costs of management change, legal restructuring, creditorscoordination and/or information
acquisition. To analyze this setting, we replace the prot after default 
 
;Ql

by 
 
;Ql
  .
This xed cost does not change output decisions but raises the welfare di¤erences W2(;R)
and V () respectively by  and (1 + ). It thus raises both the default threshold  ande. As a result, the public rm is less likely to be defaulted. The government simply avoids
the payment of the above xed cost. Does the government reduce the debt and repayment level
with higher ? As mentioned earlier, the government sets the repayment level to the level of the
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prot of the marginal rm: R =  (; Qm ())   , where the prot is now reduced by the
xed cost of audit or bankruptcy.34 Di¤erentiating totally this expression, one gets dR=d =
 1= [1  (d=dR) (d (;Qm ()) =d)]. This expression will be negative when laissez-faire
prots are not too sensitive to cost parameters and default thresholds not too sensitive to repayment
levels. In this case, the government will reduce the rms repayment level for all cost realizations.
In addition creditors will accept lower debt levels because they get lower repayment levels and pay
the additional xed cost.
34At the equilibrium, we have  = b where W2(; R) = 0 and V (b) = 0. From those last two conditions,
one gets R = 
 
;Ql ()
   evaluated at  =  = b.
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